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Abstract 
Albeit largely neglected in communication sciences research, industrial convergence has put the 
relation between legacy content media like TV broadcasters and distributors (cable, satellite) firmly on 
the policy agenda. There seems to be an increasing awareness of the gatekeeping characteristics of 
mainstream as well as online video distribution, and the power distributors can exert vis-à-vis 
television broadcasters in terms of the bundling of services and pricing.The relation between TV 
broadcasters and distributors is increasingly characterised by conflicts. Because of public disputes 
between broadcasters and distributors, and threats of blackout, several governments across Europe are 
indeed discussing the necessity of regulatory intervention in order to decrease tension and promote 
cooperation in their media sectors. The article therefore questions how broadcasters have 
problematised their relation with distributors and put it on the policy agenda, whether it is up to 
governments to intervene in the relationship between broadcasters and distributors, and whether the 
proposed policy actions are likely to remedy the tensions in the marketplace. 
 
Introduction 
   Distribution has always been a key factor in content industries. Essentially, distribution is the 
part of the media supply chain determining access to the audience. Since distributors (cable, satellite, 
etc.) have control of the television channels that reach both the aggregate audience and individual 
viewers, they act as gatekeepers and therefore have considerable market power. This means that their 
relevance is not only of an economic nature, but extends to the social and cultural, affecting content 
diversity and cultural citizenship. As the value of content depends crucially on its distribution and the 
value of distribution depends on the programming it carries, content and infrastructure are highly 
interconnected (see Croteau and Hoynes 2006; Doyle 2013b). Nevertheless, infrastructure and in 
particular the distribution of television content has been largely neglected in communication sciences 
research (Michalis 2014). In particular communications policy research has had a rather “narrow 
focus on mass media with a concurrent neglect of telecommunications” (Just and Puppis 2012, 14). 
Given the technicality of distribution, it has more often been the playground of research in fields like 
informatics. 
Although one might argue that the Internet has opened up a massive array of new means of 
distribution and, hence, that traditional modes of distribution like cable and satellite have lost power 
and/or will lose out in the future (for more information on the declining control over content 
distribution, see Braet 2013; Davenport and Beck 2001), power asymmetries between broadcasters and 
distributors are likely to persist in Europe as most viewers still use the main(stream) distribution 
networks to watch television programming (Hesmondalgh 2007). Among Europe’s 249 million 
television households, satellite is the most popular platform, accounting for 85 million homes at the 
end of 2012. Digital terrestrial television (DTT) is the second most popular way of receiving signals, 
accounting for 78 million homes. Thanks to the analogue switch-off, cable is on the rise with 68 
million homes whereas IPTV, Europe’s fastest growing television distribution market, rose to 18 
million homes. Power asymmetries between broadcasters and distributors may give rise to conflicts, 
especially if revenues are disproportionally divided between those firms that invest in content 
production and those firms that make money by reselling that content. Moreover, also between 
broadcasters and over-the-top (OTT) platforms (i.e. television content providers operating over the 
Internet without a traditional distributor being involved) such as Netflix and YouTube relations seem 
to become increasingly tense. UK broadcasters ITV and Channel 4 have protested against services like 
TV-Catchup, streaming over 50 UK television channels online without prior consent of the 
broadcasters and without any remuneration.
i
 ITV said it would pursue these and other sites it believed 
“to be infringing our copyright or using our content in an unlicensed, illegal capacity” (Halliday 
2013, sp). 
In a converged media environment, in which boundaries between actors and industries are 
blurring, the relation between legacy content media like television broadcasters and distribution 
companies has become a ‘hot topic’ in public and policy debates. There seems to be an increasing 
awareness of the gatekeeping characteristics of mainstream as well as OTT distribution, and the power 
distribution companies can exert vis-à-vis television broadcasters in terms of the bundling of services 
and pricing. Free-to-air broadcasters in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, etc. have argued that distribution companies benefit enormously from broadcasters’ 
programming without adequate compensation (Donders and Evens 2011). Observing significant 
concentration in the market for television distribution (compared to the multitude of broadcasters – 
even though concentration is also a feature of some broadcasting markets
ii
) and given the intrinsic 
dependency of free-to-air television stations from distributors to reach the audience (Oliver and 
Ohlbaum 2011, 8-9), they claim to be in a weaker bargaining position. Moreover, public broadcasters 
like BBC (UK), ARD, ZDF (Germany) and VRT (Flanders, i.e. the northern part of Belgium) have 
protested against (commercial communication) overlays on their programming, which – so they argue 
– goes against their editorial autonomy and responsibility (see, for example, Vlaams Parlement 
2013a). Whereas the Court of Justice of the EU (2013) has explicitly confirmed that services like TV-
Catchup operate illegally, failing to respect basic principles of copyright law, other issues related to, 
what we would dub, ‘economic fairness’ and ‘content integrity’ are less easily captured by existing 
policies and laws applying to media and electronic communications. 
Broadcasting-distribution relations are influenced by five factors: i.e. the structure of the 
industry, the structure of the involved companies, the type of services concerned in the relation, 
personalities, and policy (see Figure 1 below). For research on the first three aspects we refer to 
previous work (Evens and Donders 2013). While expert interviews with industry representatives (see 
Donders and Evens 2011) show that rather ‘personal’ and even emotional issues play a considerable 
role in broadcasting-distribution relations, this aspect is difficult to study in an empirically valid way. 
The policy factor deserves more attention, however. Because of public disputes between broadcasters 
and distributors, and threats of blackout, several governments across Europe are indeed discussing the 
necessity of regulatory intervention in order to decrease tension and promote cooperation in their 
media sectors. An analysis of these policy initiatives is in place at this stage as government action at 
the European and/or national level might have significant effects on the media value chain and, 
consequently, be of importance to citizens across Europe. Indeed, whereas media business literature 
sometimes underestimates the policy factor, reducing it to some sort of exogenous factor, it is in fact a 
shaping force (Croteau and Hoynes 2006, 65; for an illustration of the impact of media policy on 
specific media systems, see, for example, Doyle 2013a; Kuhn 2013; Donders and Van den Bulck 
2013) in emerging and/or changing media markets. 
 Figure 1: Factors influencing broadcast-distribution relations (Source: authors) 
The article therefore questions how broadcasters have problematized their relation with 
distribution companies and put in on the policy agenda, whether it is up to governments to intervene in 
the relationship between broadcasters and distributors, and whether the proposed policy actions are 
likely to remedy the tensions in the marketplace. 
Structure and methodology 
The article consists of four parts. Firstly, we elaborate on the role of distribution in media 
industries. A brief theoretical background for the discussion on broadcaster-distributor relationships is 
provided, drawing mainly from insights from political economy of communication scholars. 
We, secondly, on the basis of a qualitative analysis of press releases, popular press articles, 
statements in Parliament, etc. carry out an argument mapping exercise (see Dunn 2012), which focuses 
on how broadcasters problematize their relation with distributors. Such an analysis is necessary as 
problems are by no means ‘natural phenomenons’, waiting ‘out there’ to be found, but rather 
constructs that are interdependent, instable and dynamic in nature. Problems are constructed through 
human interaction and pushed onto or, as emphasized by Freedman (2008), of the policy agenda.  
“Inexperienced analysts suppose that problems are purely objective conditions that are determined by 
the ‘facts’. This methodologically innocent view fails to recognize that the same facts – for example, 
statistics that show that global warming is on the upswing – are interpreted in varied ways by policy 
stakeholders. For this reason, the same policy-relevant information frequently results in conflicting 
definitions of a ‘problem’. These definitions are shaped by personal and institutional interests, 
assumptions about human nature, ideas about the proper role of government, and beliefs about the 
nature of knowledge itself.” (Dunn 2012, 66) 
We also take into account whether and how distributors, governments and scholars 
provisionally take stance on this topic. Who defines the problems? How are commercial problems 
turned into wider public interest concerns? Whose interests are served best by the problems defined? 
Answering these questions, we draw from literature review and desk research, covering experiences in 
the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, etc.  
Specifically, an argument mapping exercise centers on the following elements: claim (what do 
stakeholders want policy makers to do?), information (what data do they provide to sustain their 
claim?), motivation (why should policy makers follow-up on the claim made?), qualifier (is this likely 
to help?), and backing (why is the motivation valid?). Objections (i.e. counter-arguments from other 
stakeholders) are most often also mapped as to allow for a more complete and even-handed analysis. 
The aim of an argument mapping is to arrange all elements of a certain discourse in a coherent way 
and to find for inconsistencies or missing information.  
Thirdly, we look at the emerging policy answers at the European level and in two countries 
(the Netherlands and Belgium – more specifically the Flemish Community or ‘Flanders’ that is the 
autonomous level of government in the area of media policy making), which have taken legislative 
action in this respect and were selected for our analysis for that reason. This part is largely based on a 
qualitative document analysis in context of policy and legal documents, complemented with insights 
from company reports and popular press coverage. Documents are treated both as sources of factual 
information on the policy outcome (i.e. which rules have been adopted?) as well as reflections of the 
policy process (i.e. why were these rules adopted?)(Karppinen and Moe 2012). The Netherlands and 
Flanders were selected as two particularly interesting case studies as they are the only two countries 
that have adopted laws to deal with the issue of content integrity. Focus of the case studies (for 
methodological elaboration, see Vennesson 2008) is on the newly adopted laws on content/signal 
integrity in these two countries. Other rules, e.g., must carry obligations distribution companies have 
to abide by are not part of the research.  
Fourthly, we evaluate whether the emerging policy initiatives are likely to affect broadcasting-
distribution relations, in what way, and whether such change is desirable at all. Will, for example and 
too often neglected, citizens benefit from the adopted legislation? Such an analysis is important as 
policy makers are often guided by partial information provided by broadcasters and distribution 
companies. Of course, their information can be instructive, but remains largely anecdotal. Finally, 
some conclusions and recommendations for further research and policy are outlined.  
The role of distribution in media industries 
Much of the literature regarding the role of distribution in media industries is rooted in the 
political economy of communication. This rather critical approach aims at unravelling power 
relationships in media markets and analysing structural processes of control over the production, 
distribution and consumption of media (Mosco 2009). Already in 1987 Nicholas Garnham claimed 
that “it is cultural distribution, not cultural production, that is the locus of power and profit” (31). 
Garnham contends that, because the business of cultural goods is much about ‘creating audiences’ as it 
is about ‘producing cultural artefacts’, distribution is characterised by the highest level of capital 
intensity, ownership concentration and multi-nationalisation. In a similar vein, Hesmondhalgh (2007) 
points to the hourglass structure of the media industries (many producers, few distributors) and argues 
that power resides with those firms that control distribution of cultural production. Miège (2011) 
observes a particular rise in the position of hardware manufacturers, web players and telecom firms, 
exerting control of all information that is distributed over their networks. Cunningham and Silver 
(2013) pose that the power and profitability in screen industries have always resided in distribution, 
and born digital, globally focused players like YouTube, Apple and Netflix will become the King 
Kongs of the media industries. 
Undeniably, the rise of multichannel TV (cable and satellite), the transition to digital and the 
popularity of the Internet (streaming and downloading) as a new distribution platform affect the power 
structures and relationships in the audiovisual media landscape. Following a more technology-
optimistic perspective, Todreas (1999) and Benkler (2006) claim that new technology is likely to 
erode the monopolistic control over distribution and contends that the economic power conferred by 
control over distribution networks is being reconfigured around alternative sources of economic rents, 
such as copyright regimes. In addition, Christophers (2008) insists that power in the media landscape 
has shifted in favour of content producers and television broadcasters. Profits will move upstream as 
content has the opportunity to create branded, high-quality products.  
A third strand perspective (e.g. Doyle 2013b, Evens 2013a) stresses the mutual power between 
television producers and distributors, and points to the interdependency between audiovisual 
production and distribution. Broadcasters need distribution to generate advertising revenues whereas 
distributors need programming. Furthermore, they emphasize the importance of the political and 
economic context of production and distribution to assess power relationships. Whereas in some 
markets distributors are the leading party, broadcasters may be powerful in other markets.  
Focus of the next section is on uncovering which of the abovementioned theoretical 
approaches is reflected most in broadcasters’ ‘structuring’ of their problematic relation with television 
distribution companies and whether that approach is also visible in emerging policy initiatives.  
Perceived problems and diverging interpretations: In search of empirical data   
This article zooms in on the definition of a policy problem (i.e. the problematic relation 
between broadcasters and distributors), emerging policy solutions dealing with this problem, and the 
aptness of these emerging policies. Looking first at the ‘problem structuring’ issue, this section 
analyses the numerous issues that are raised by broadcasters in relation to broadcasting-distribution 
relations and subsequently ‘problematized’ by broadcasters. The latter’s claims and arguments are 
discussed and summarized through an argument mapping exercise (see methodological section, cf. 
supra), including, but not focussing on, counterarguments made by distributors (i.e. objections). Aside 
from other possible conflicts that might be dealt with (e.g., must-carry of linear and non-linear 
services), the focus of the article is on two problems, constructed by broadcasters (Figure 2). First, 
alleged unfair economic practices with distributors failing to adequately remunerate broadcasters for 
their content. Second, distributors’ interventions with broadcasters’ editorial autonomy and 
responsibility. The authors are at this point not implying that these problems are ‘real’. Rather, the aim 
of the analysis is to ‘de-construct’ the construction of a policy problem by several free-to-air 
broadcasters.  
 
 Figure 2: Argument mapping of broadcast-distribution relations 
 
‘Unfair’ economic practices and investment in local content  
Discussions between free-to-air broadcasters and distributors are captured by the tension 
between maximizing own revenues on the one hand while not jeopardizing a long-lasting contractual 
relation. Broadcasters argue that relations with distributors are (no longer) economically ‘fair’. To 
sustain this argument, they point at two issues. First, there are conflicts about so-called ‘retransmission 
payments’ and ‘distribution costs’. The former are paid by distributors to broadcasters as can be 
regarded as a remuneration for the exploitation of broadcasters’ signal; the latter flow from 
broadcasters to distributors in exchange for carriage (Evens 2013a). The variety in contracts between 
broadcasters and distributors is enormous, and needs to be investigated in the local political and 
economic context. In the UK, free-to-air broadcasters, including the BBC, have paid substantial 
amounts for carriage to BSkyB without a retransmission sum being paid to them (Mediatique 2012). 
However, free-to-air broadcasters in Denmark, the Netherlands and Flanders receive substantial 
retransmission payments. However, even in these cases most broadcasters hold that the sum they 
receive is too low in comparison with the contribution made to distributors’ offer to consumers. 
Broadcasters claim that they carry the bulk of investments in quality content whereas distributors take 
a disproprtional share of the pie, without significantly contributing to the financing and production of 
that content. According to UK media regulator Ofcom (2012), in 2010, UK public service broadcasters 
spent 27% of their revenues on domestic first-run originations (£1.868 billion) compared to only 2% 
for pay-TV operators (£215 million). In this regard, a senior UK television executive, quoted by The 
Guardian journalist Mark Sweney (2011, sp) said “We all pay a fair amount of money to Sky and 
provide them with free channels, but no money flows to us. Yet, where would their platform be without 
PSB channels? How many people would subscribe?”  
 
A second problem put forward by broadcasters relates to the new television functionalities 
offered by distributors to consumers: the digital video recorder (DVR), the electronic program guide 
(EPG), ad-skipping, ‘flex view’ with various degrees of recording facilities, etc. These services are a 
thorn in the flesh of many broadcasters. While traditional advertising remains overwhelmingly 
important in free-to-air broadcasters’ revenues (about 30% of the television industry’s turnover), the 
revenue model is undeniably under pressure and this, seemingly, to the benefit of more customized 
services offered by distributors and OTT players that allow ad-avoiding behaviour (Picard 2013; 
Knapp 2013). In particular in Flanders, television broadcasters oppose distributors’ practices in this 
regard. The argument is that distributors build business models (ab)using broadcasters’ content 
without appropriate financial compensation. The analogy with companies like Google and Facebook, 
using content from legacy media to the benefit of their business model holds. Television executive 
Christian Van Thillo (Medialaan) said distributors give away content for free in order to lock in 
consumers in triple play bundles (television, Internet and telephony). Arguing he did not oppose flex 
view and other types of services, he did say broadcasters should receive a fair compensation for this 
additional use of their signal. Otherwise, so Van Thillo claimed, broadcasters will become unable to 
uphold investments in domestic content. In other words: distributors can ‘play around’ with 
broadcasters’ signal provided they have the latter’s prior consent, which will in most cases depend 
upon a contractually arranged remuneration flowing from distributor to broadcaster.  
“There is disagreement [between broadcasters and distributors] on several issues, but essentially it 
comes down to the television signal. The question is whether a TV channel, which represents a brand, 
a program schedule, presenters and channel values, is owner of the signal. Of course, it is the owner 
of that signal. Otherwise, we might better quit the business. A newspaper company, for example, also 
owns its product until it is in the shop.” (in NN 2013a, sp; own translation; emphasis added by 
authors) 
Both inadequate retransmission payments and lack of compensation for new services would, 
according to several broadcasters, result in declining investments in original domestic content which 
are an important instigator of economic growth in the audioviual production sector but the most 
expensive programming genre to produce. Delayed viewing and hence ad-skipping in the 18-54 age 
category has made it difficult to raise advertising income and therefore produce profitable domestic 
series, so it is argued. Flemish private broadcaster VMMa has, for example, provided figures that 
illustrate the pervasive nature of delayed viewing (with approximately 80% of ad-skipping), in 
particular when drama series (the most costly content) are concerned. Figure 3 shows a substantial and 
continuous increase in delayed viewing could be observed for its most popular programs. Delayed 
viewing figures for drama series like Danni Lowinski went from 27.3 in 2012 to 36.5% in 2013 (with 
no further broadcasts of the series in 2014 and also no broadcasts of telenovellas anymore) and even 
‘live’ entertainment is captured by the phenomenon of delayed viewing.iii Preliminary figures indeed 
suggest that investments by broadcasters in domestic, independent productions have fallen since 2007. 
In recent years, investments in domestic production have dropped with 30%, whereas output in terms 
of hours of domestic content has fallen with 15% (Loisen 2011; Vlaams Parlement 2013c).  
 
 Figure 3: Delayed viewing in 2012 for Flemish Television – per program (Source: CIM) 
 
Editorial autonomy, independence and responsibility  
Discussions between broadcasters and distributors do not solely revolve around financial 
issues; they also relate to broadcasters’ editorial autonomy and responsibility. The former refers to 
broadcasters’ independence in scheduling and producing programs. It is related to the fundamental 
right of freedom of expression and as such recognized by all EU Member States’ constitutions. The 
latter refers to the fact that broadcasters are obliged by law to comply with rules on the protection of 
minors, commercial communication, hate speech, European content quotas, etc. They are ‘editorially 
responsible’ for the content that is being broadcast, even if distributed by a cable, satellite or OTT 
provider of television services. Indeed, it is presumed by the Audiovisual Media Services Directive 
that broadcasters hold “effective control both over the selection of programmes and over their 
organisation” (Article 1(c) of the AVMSD).  
Their editorial autonomy and responsibility is, according to broadcasters, being breached by 
distributors when these, for example, put overlays on broadcasters’ programming. Overlays can refer 
to social media, might advertise programs of a similar genre consumers are watching, or can concern 
commercial communication messages that are not administered by broadcasters but by distributors. In 
Germany, the UK and Flanders there have been heated debates on the legality of overlays. In 
Germany, public broadcaster ZDF noticed Panasonic was putting overlays on news bulletins. These 
overlays concerned commercial communication, advertising for among others MySpace. In the UK 
streaming service TV Catchup immersed BBC programming with commercial communication. Some 
users protested in forums, saying such a practice was against UK regulation. TV Catchup counter-
argued, saying it was legally entitled to run advertising before BBC programs (ignoring the banners 
surrounding programs) and even inquiring after users’ motivation to protest against its practices. In 
fact, the company was supported by some viewers, saying BBC itself also behaved in very commercial 
ways and, hence, not noticing so much of a difference between BBC’s and TV Catchup’s behaviour.iv 
In Flanders telecommunications incumbent Belgacom and also cable provider Telenet put overlays on 
public service children’s programming, in so doing not only ignoring public broadcaster’s VRT 
editorial autonomy, but also going against the provisions of the Flemish media decree that hold that 
children’s programming on public service television should be free from commercial communication. 
The distributors are not held by these provisions, as it are the broadcasters that are editorially 
responsible.  
The abovementioned practices puzzle regulators. They might raise questions on what levels of 
protection consumers expect in an inter-connected media environment. More importantly, overlays 
and similar practices challenge basic notions of editorial autonomy and responsibility. Author rights 
law, including the internationally agreed rules of the Berner Convention, might at first sight seem clear 
on this: people or companies that want to adapt legally protected works need permission of the author 
to do so. The question is whether adding something (e.g. an overlay) without actually changing the 
underlying content is an adaptation indeed.  
An overarching problem identified by broadcasters relates to the concentration of market 
power in distribution markets, producing relative bargaining power vis-à-vis broadcasters. In fact, it is 
argued that the oligopolistic market structure of distribution in several EU Member States explains for 
the weak bargaining position of broadcasters in supposedly ‘normal’ buyer-supplier negotiations and 
justifies regulatory intervention. The standard economic case in favour of government intervention in 
media industries is that market failure occurs and needs to be corrected (Doyle 2013b). Regulatory 
intervention may thus be required to deal with the problem of externalities and to restrict the exercise 
of oligopoly power. In a BBC commissioned report Oliver and Ohlbaum (2011, 2) indeed argue that 
regulatory intervention is necessary “to help set the terms of retransmission” and rebalance power 
asymmetries between broadcasters and distributors. Such intervention, so the report continues, merely 
recognizes that “negotiations between leading networks and third party platforms are unlikely to lead 
to an optimal outcome”.  
In short, broadcasters argue regulatory intervention is needed to correct, what they deem, 
asymmetric buyer-supplier relations. In so doing, they identify two problems. First, they argue that 
lack of adequate financial compensation exemplifies unfair economic behaviour from distributors and 
will eventually result in declining investments in domestic content. Given the topical nature of the 
discussion, few empirical evidence (leaving aside the anecdotal information provided by broadcasters 
themselves, see above) backs this claim. Secondly, they – and in particular public broadcasters – point 
at their editorial responsibility and the protection of consumers, which is foreseen by both European 
and national media regulation. In spite of some research on broadcast-distribution relations (see, for 
example, Evens and Donders 2013), there are few, independent and comprehensive studies of the 
issue. Policy makers are often guided by partial information provided by broadcasters, which can be 
instructive, but remains largely anecdotal.  
As the following shorter section illustrates the objections made to the claims made by 
broadcasters are equally vague and are not sustained by empirical evidence either.  
Objections  
 
From their side, distributors (see Vlaams Parlement 2013b) have consistenly argued that the 
above type of reasoning is the reason for broadcasters’ threatened position. It is claimed that 
broadcasters are too conservative, fear innovation and under-estimate the capacity of the viewer to 
tape programs and skip ads even when distributors do not enable this (given the availability of low-
cost recording alternatives like TiVo or AutoHop). Furthermore, broadcasters would over-estimate the 
uptake of DVR functionalities and the popularity of ad-skipping (Deloitte 2011). In addition, it is said 
that broadcasters deny distributors’ contribution to their business model by providing access to 
audiences and ignore the investments cable, satellite and other distribution companies make in order to 
ensure performant infrastructure networks. Belgian network incumbent and IPTV provider Belgacom 
claims it invested over €500 million in the deployment of VDSL2 infrastructure to ensure high-
bandwidth services such as HDTV. With its "Digital Wave 2015’ program, cable TV operator Telenet 
announced an extra €30 million per year to upgrade its network to DOCSIS 3.0. Hence, they claim it is 
not irreasonable to charge broadcasters that seek access to the distribution network. As said by a Sky 
spokesperson: “We ask for a financial contribution that reflects the performance of channels on the 
Sky platform, with those who benefit the most paying accordingly.” (Sweney 2011). Finally, 
distributors often contend that they pay free-to-air broadcasters much higher retransmission fees 
compared to other markets, most notably the US. Since they do not provide actual data, these claims 
are hard to verify though. 
Possible solutions: The protection of the integrity of broadcasters’ content  
In the UK the Minister of Culture Ed Vaizey said: “We’re not going to rush into a regulatory 
solution because I believe there’s no reason the market shouldn’t be able to work out a fair and 
equitable solution as things stand” (yet, hinting at regulation when industry fails to come to a 
consensus)(Sweney 2013, sp). However, in Flanders and the Netherlands, governments have decided 
to take action, adopting amended media laws; and also at the European level there is a definite interest 
in following up on this issue.  
European Union: Towards establishing content integrity 
 In January 2013, the Committee on Culture and Education of the European Parliament 
published a draft report on Connected TV. Referring to cultural diversity, fundamental rights like 
freedom of expression, and the importance of public service broadcasting, the Committee called for a 
resolution of the European Parliament on issues related to hybrid and connected TV. In its draft report, 
the Committee urges the European Commission to revise the Audiovisual Media Services Directive. It 
should lay down provisions that will control “the availability of, and access to, audiovisual media 
services and other communications services or their representation on hybrid receiving devices, so as 
to prevent producers of such receiving devices or suppliers of the services in question from exploiting 
their gatekeeper position in which which discriminates against content providers” (Committee on 
Culture and Education 2013, 5). Whereas the Committee explicitly refers to the importance of 
‘findability’ of public service content on new platforms, it also calls for a flexibele approach towards 
advertising rules in the Audiovisual Media Services Directive as to allow the exploitation of new 
opportunities (Idem, 6).  
Besides these more generic principles, which emphasize the importance of a level-playing 
field for both platform owners and content providers, the Committee also introduces the principle of 
‘integrity of services’, providing: 
“Calls on the Commission to safeguard by law the integrity of linear and non-linear services on 
hybrid platforms and in particular to prohibit the overlay or scaling of these services with third-party 
content, unless the latter have been authorised by the content provider and explicitly initiated by the 
user; points out that unauthorised use or dissemination by third parties of the content or broadcast 
signals of a provider must likewise be prevented.” (Idem, 6-7; emphasis added by authors) 
Interestingly, the report does not make any reference to copyright in this regard. It positions 
‘integrity’ of services or content as a new concept. It does not define the concept, however. Indeed, the 
Committee gives the example of overlays and asks for a prohibition of these “unless the latter have 
been authorised by the content provider and explicitly initiated by the user” (see above). Integrity is, 
hence, linked to some sort of ownership by the content provider as the latter should authorize a 
modification (like, for example, an overlay). Integrity is, moreover, related to the rights of consumers.  
It remains to be seen whether and how the concept will appear in an eventual resolution of the 
European Parliament. Similarly, the European Commission still needs to pick it up in a its revision of 
the Audiovisual Media Services Directive – a revision that has not started off yet and is not likely to 
be completed soon. However, it is very likely that Member States might pro-actively engage with the 
issue, triggering prejudicial interpretations of the Court of Justice of the European Union.  
The Netherlands: Editorial autonomy and content integrity  
In the Netherlands an amendment of the media law has been proposed by members of 
Parliament in spring 2013 and subsequently adopted in summer. Specifically, the new rule allow for 
‘ministerial regulations’, which provide that the signal of some designated services should be 
considered an integral part of program channels and that more specific rules can be specified for the 
transmission of these services (Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal 2013).
v
 In other words: whereas 
the Dutch media law already provided that broadcasting programs have to be transmitted ‘unaltered’, it 
could potentially and in a flexible way add more specific rules in this regard. Indeed, a ‘ministerial 
regulation’ can be adopted quite easily and does not require lengthy, burdensome (yet, democratic!) 
parliamentary processes.  
Concretely, the change of the Dutch media law could (in case a ministerial regulation follows) 
make it possible for broadcasters to make sure that particular services are transmitted together with 
their programs as these services are considered an integral part of the broadcasting signal. Subtitling is 
explicitly referred to, but in the elucidation of the legislative proposal reference is also made in a 
rather broad, all-encompassing manner, to ‘interactive’ services (Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal 
2013, 1-2). There is no mentioning of the prior authorisation or prohibition of particular services like 
add-skipping and delayed viewing, however.  
Flanders: Signal integrity  
Flanders has probably taken the most pro-active approach in tackling tensions between 
broadcasters and distributors. Since 2010, when the CEOs of the three main broadcasting companies in 
Flanders (public broadcaster VRT and commercial broadcasters VMMa and SBS) wrote a joint letter 
to cable operator Telenet complaining about services like delayed viewing, tensions between 
broadcasters and distributors have been on the rise in Flanders. The argument on falling investments in 
Flemish content has found fertile ground in Flemish politics. After all, there has been a long-lasting 
commitment to ensure the production and broadcasting of local content in Flanders, which is a region 
that is very much aware of its cultural heritage in a ‘difficult’ country like Belgium with three 
language communities (i.e. the Dutch, French and German language communities).  
In spite of very contentious and conflictuous debates in Flemish Parliament, the Commission 
Media of the Flemish Parliament reached a consensus on a legislative proposal acknowledging that 
broadcasters are the owner of the broadcast signal on 11 June 2013. The legislative proposal was 
unanimously adopted in the Commission Media of the Flemish Parliament on June, 25; and 
subsequently voted unanimously across opposition and government in Flemish Parliament on July, 10. 
The decree provides quite revolutionary that service providers (whether cable, xDSL, satellite, OTT, 
…) have to transmit the television broadcast signal without interruptions or alterations. All 
functionalities that go against this require the prior consent of the concerned television broadcasters 
(and possible additional payment). In the absence of prior consent a conciliation procedure of three 
months, facilitated by the Flemish Regulator for the Media, can be initiated. Functionalities that go 
against the editorial independence, autonomy and responsibility of broadcasters can be refused by 
broadcasters and no conciliation procedure is required in this regard. In case broadcasters receive 
additional remuneration for allowing specific functionalities, these revenues have to be invested in the 
production of Flemish content (Vlaams Parlement 2013a).  
Article 180 (§1-2) of the Flemish media decree
vi
 thus recognizes or at least implicitly refers to 
principles of economisch fairness and editorial responsibility. It emphasizes the necessity of 
negotiation, with the important requirement for distribution companies to have the prior consent of 
broadcasters in case they want to add functionalities to the latter’s signal. In the elucidation of the 
proposal of decree, emphasis is put mainly on the cultural motivations (i.e. protection of Flemish 
content, the Dutch language, etc.) underlying the new legislation.   
Problem solved? The multi-faceted nature of problems and the necessary multi-faceted nature of 
policies  
Few observers will deny the tensions in broadcasting-distribution markets. Media markets are 
in turmoil and power relations are in some instances asymmetric (but not necessarily always in favour 
of distributors). EU distributors are often more powerful than free-to-air broadcasters due to oligopoly 
control over distribution facilities, and can exert substantial bargaining power during carriage 
negotiations. In contrast to the US, domestic broadcasters in the EU are less integrated with powerful 
production studios and have less leverage vis-à-vis prominent distribution powerhouses including Sky, 
Liberty Global and Vodafone (Evens 2013b). This asymmetry is not problematic per se. The exercise 
of power in buyer-supplier relations does not always generate negative consequences for the party that 
is less powerful. Powerful parties like distribution companies, that very often hold gatekeeper 
positions, might undertake actions that improve coordination and result in benefits for both parties 
(dubbed ‘pie-expansion’). In that case, the weaker party has to be able to rely on the dominant party to 
engage also in ‘pie-sharing’. Indeed, imbalanced relationships can be characterized by mutual trust, 
but only in case the powerful party treats the weaker party fairly. And this is where the shoe often 
pinches.  
Albeit being questioned by distributors, the emerging policy initiatives in the EU have merit. 
The draft report of the Committee on Culture and Education of the European Parliament minimum 
minimorum puts an important issue on the policy agenda. Far too often content and infrastructure have 
been treated separately by policy makers at the national, European and international level. In its 
discussion of hybrid and connected television, the Parliament adopts a more integrated approach, 
which is recommendable and might trigger further discussion in the future. One should hope this will 
be the case as a European solution for this problem seems most desirable. The Dutch approach seems 
quite prudent. It assigns ownership of the broadcast signal to broadcasters, covering also services 
added to the program. However, its notion of content integrity is less wide-ranging in comparison with 
the Flemish media decree. The latter goes much further and is more disruptive, requiring prior 
authorisation of broadcasters for all new functionalities added to the broadcast signal by distributors.  
It remains to be seen which approach, the Dutch or Flemish, will stand the test of time, and 
which will solve the problems identified by policy makers. Indeed, whereas the Dutch text is more 
prudent and might, hence, be acceptable from a European internal market point of view, the Flemish 
text might be more effective (in terms of changing broadcast-distribution relations) while being more 
vulnerable to European criticism for being disproportionally affecting distributors’ delivery of 
services. Moreover, there are not only the tests of the European Commission (with DG Internal Market 
investigating whether the Flemish signal integrity decree is in line with the E-commerce and 
Transparency directives and the Electronic Communication Package) and the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (should a prejudicial question be raised), but there is also the test of technology. 
Indeed, how likely is it that consumers can and will circumvent restrictive measures imposed by policy 
makers?  
To some extent, taking the merit of these actions and also the related uncertainties into 
account, the Dutch and Flemish initiatives concern alterations of media law. Whereas this might be a 
step in the good direction, the problems identified in the second section of this article are multi-
faceted. They touch upon content and infrastructure, different legislative frameworks, companies 
across the media value chain, changing technologies, business models under pressure, etc. This means 
these problems, if and when substantiated better by empirical evidence, require a multi-faceted policy 
as well. Although current initiatives might result in some short-term changes, they ‘alone ’ will not do 
the trick as broadcast-distribution relations are affected by four types of policies: media policy, 
copyright law, competition law and electronic communications law. 
Conclusion  
Answering the first question raised in this article, i.e. how broadcasters constructed their 
relation with distributors as a policy problem, it is clear that free-to-air broadcasters rely very much on 
a blended cultural and economic argumentation, pointing at the cultural importance of freely 
accessible domestic programming for audiences on the one hand and the economic interest of 
governments to protect/shield a sustainable and local development of broadcasting markets. They 
adhere to a conflictual ‘distribution-takes-all’ approach, which is (to some extent) accepted in 
emerging policy initiatives in the Netherlands and Flanders. Indeed, we illustrated that governments 
are in some cases intervening, albeit in different ways. The approach in the Netherlands and Flanders 
is, for example, similar at first sight, but very different when taking a closer look. This will most likely 
raise issues within a European internal market. Thirdly, it remains to be seen whether the adopted 
legislation will solve the problems broadcasters identify. Both the legal and technological ‘sell-by-
date’ of the rules is debatable. In addition, the adopted rules set out from the assumption that 
broadcasters have to be protected from distribution companies, an assumption that is based on another 
assumption that distributors can exert a linear, top-down influence on broadcasters. Such an 
assumption is flawed and neglects recent scholarly work, which provides evidence of a more circular 
power relationship between television broadcasters and distributors.   
The media sector, including broadcasting and distribution, will continue to change. 
Technological change, internationalisation and consolidation of the media sector will make policies 
increasingly difficult to enforce. National legal initiatives are also likely to be challenged at the 
European level, even though initiatives like the European Media Futures Forum (2012), emphasizing 
the importance of European content industries, seem to indicate a more balanced approach towards 
infrastructure and content issues might emerge at the European level, correcting the previous 
predominant focus on infrastructure. Policies of course also have difficulties keeping pace with fast 
technological evolutions. That does not mean, however, that policy makers should not explore the 
possible means to protect local content, quality programming, pluralism and diversity. In so doing, 
they should however not opt for easy symbolic solutions, but go for a complementary policy approach. 
This requires, first and foremost, an adequate structuring of problems. With regard to this issue it is 
not altogether clear what exactly is the basic policy problem: too low retransmission payments, a lack 
of economic rewards for new, interactive services, or competitive imbalances in media markets with 
some companies occupying gatekeeping positions. Moreover, more scientific research on these 
markets and in particular the interplay between content and infrastructure markets is necessary to have 
some empirical data policy makers can rely on when developing policies. On a final note, policy 
makers should avoid the trap of overt protectionism. This does not mean that there is no public value 
in the economic protection of local companies. However, one should be aware of mere 
instrumentalization to serve short term needs of industry on both infrastructure and content sides. 
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i http://www.tvcatchup.com/ 
ii The multitude of broadcasters does, however, not guarantee diversity and pluralism in the market. 
iii CIM is the Centre for Information on Media in Flanders. It records all figures regarding television viewing in 
Flanders (http://www.cim.be/). 
iv See, for example, http://forums.tvcatchup.com/showthread.php?11456-Having-adverts-on-any-bbc-channel-is-
against-regulation 
v Translation from Dutch: “Bij ministeriële regeling kunnen diensten worden aangewezen waarvan het signaal als 
integraal onderdeel van de programmakanalen moet worden doorgegeven en kunnen nadere regels worden gesteld voor 
de doorgifte van deze diensten.” 
vi Article 180: “§1. Dienstenverdelers geven de lineaire televisieomroepprogramma’s die deel uitmaken van hun aanbod 
van televisiediensten in de Vlaamse Gemeenschap, onverkort, ongewijzigd en in hun geheel, door op het ogenblik dat ze 
worden uitgezonden. Dat geldt ook voor de bijbehorende diensten, vermeld in artikel 185, §1, tweede lid, laatste zin. §2. 
Elke functionaliteit die een dienstenverdeler aan de eindgebruikers aanbiedt en die het mogelijk maakt om de in het 
eerste lid bedoelde lineaire televisieomroepprogramma’s op een uitgestelde, verkorte of gewijzigde wijze te bekijken, is 
onderworpen aan de voorafgaande toestemming van de betrokken televisieomroeporganisatie. De voorafgaande 
toestemming is vereist van iedere televisieomroeporganisatie die onder het toepassingsgebied van artikel 154, eerste en 
tweede lid, valt. De betrokken televisieomroeporganisatie en dienstenverdeler onderhandelen te goeder trouw en dienen 
hun toestemmingswijze op een redelijke en proportionele wijze uit te oefenen. Wanneer een akkoord hierover leidt tot 
financiële vergoedingen van de dienstenverdelers aan de televisieomroeporganisaties, dan dienen die te worden 
aangewend voor Nederlandstalige Europese producties, overeenkomstig artikel 154.”  
 
 
